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Abstract
Stock-market crashes tend to follow run-ups in prices. These episodes look
like bubbles that gradually inflate and then suddenly burst. We show that
such bubbles can form in a Zeira-Rob type of model in which demand size is
uncertain. Two conditions are sufficient for this to happen: A declining hazard
rate in the prior distribution over market size and a convex cost of investment.
For the period 1971-2001 we fit the model to the Telecom sector.
1 Introduction
Stock-market crashes tend to follow run-ups in prices. The NYSE index rose in the
late 1920s, and then crashed in October 1929, and the Nasdaq rose steadily through
the 80’s and 90’s and crashed after March 2000. These episodes therefore look like
bubbles that gradually inflate and then suddenly burst.
In a learning model of the Zeira-Rob type we study the possibility of bubble-
like behavior of stock prices, but driven by fundamentals. This model generates a
crash when an irreversible creation of capacity overshoots demand. We add to Rob
(1991) a convex adjustment cost for the growth of industry capacity and a declining
hazard rate in the prior distribution over market size. Many of the ideas are also in
Zeira (1987, 1999), Caplin and Leahy (1994) and in Horvath, Schivardi and Woywode
(2001).
Figure 1 portrays the 30-year history of the Nasdaq index and its Telecom com-
ponent. The first panel shows the financial side, the second also includes indexes of
real activity. The two panels seem to be linked in that they both experience a sharp
reduction in early 2000. We seek to explain this link — the slow but simultaneous rise
in the stock market and the capital invested and then a sharp and sudden decline.
∗We thank M. Ebell for comments and the NSF for support.
†University of Chicago
‡NYU and University of Chicago
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Figure 1: Evolution of Stock Prices and of Fundamentals
The link exists other sectors too, where value appears to have responded the funda-
mentals around the time of the 2001 crash. Figure 2 reports the March 2000-to-March
2001 changes in prices and in fundamentals. Sectors that experienced greater drops
in value also experienced larger declines in sales.
Our explanation of the run-up is of the “Peso Problem” type. Krasker (1980)
used this term to describe the rational response of agents to a major event that is not
realized within the sample period. Before the year 2000, that was how things looked
to agents in the market. Two conditions that jointly lead to such an outcome are: (i)
A declining hazard rate in the prior distribution over market size and (ii) A convex
cost of investment. The “decreasing hazard” assumption is the technical feature of
the model ensuring that, as the market grows, further growth looks ever more feasible,
and the likelihood of a crash looks ever more remote. In such a situation it is rational
to be more and more optimistic about the market’s growth potential as market size
increases. If and when the crash does come, however, our model predicts that
• the more remote the possibility of a crash looks, and
• the steeper the adjustment cost of rapid creation of capacity,
the bigger the crash will be. We shall fit the model to the Telecom sector where a
substantial crash decidedly did happen in early 2000.1
The welfare implication is rather surprising: Along the path to the crash, invest-
ment was not too fast but too slow. In other words, our model states that in light of
what was known at the time, Telecom capacity should have expanded more rapidly
1An example is the collapse in the price of on-line advertising at sites such as Yahoo and AOL —
by a factor of three or more — and those of their competitors (Angwin 2002).
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Figure 2: (March 2000-March 2001) Size of crash vs. changes in sales
(panel 1) and changes in capacity (panel 2)
and its the crash should have happened earlier. This is because expanding capac-
ity entails a positive informational externality that a competitive firm ignores when
choosing how much to invest. Along the equilibrium path the crash hazard declines,
so that older markets are more likely to survive.
Other work stressing the role of fundamentals in market crashes is Boldrin and
Levine (2000), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999), and Jovanovic and MacDonald
(1994), who focus on the effect that arrival on a new technology has on devalu-
ing the existing technology, and Mazzucato and Semmler (1999), who find that in the
automobile industry stock prices were the most volatile during the period 1918-1928
when market shares were the most unstable.
Section 2 models a single industry in which producers take the prices of their
product and inputs as given. Section 3 simulates the model. Section 4 offers prelim-
inary evidence on the model. Section 5 estimates the prior distribution over market
size on which everything hinges. Section 6 contains some extensions.
2 Model
The model is one of an industry that has a well-defined notion of market size. Invest-
ing in this market is risky because capacity may exceed market size. Firms continually
update their beliefs about what market size and create new capacity based on these
beliefs. When capacity outstrips demand, the price falls and further growth stops.
We study the dynamics leading up to the crash.
Demand.–The market demand function expresses willingness to pay as a function
3
 Realized demand curve 
P(Q, z2) 
 
    z1                    z2                      z3                       Q
p 
Price 
Figure 3: Typical demand curve P (Q, z2)
of the quantity, Q, supplied to the market,
P (Q, z) =
½
p if Q ≤ z
0 if Q > z
Demand is uncertain. Willingness to pay, p, is known. What is unknown is the
extend of demand, the true realization of which is denoted by z, which we may think
of as the number of new consumers, each demanding one unit of good per unit time.
The parameter z does not change over time. Its a random variable drawn at time
t = 0 from a distribution F (z) and never drawn again afterwards; 3 shows a family
of demand curves indexed by various values of z, and highlights the demand curve
that would occur if z = z2. The distribution F (z) is common knowledge among the
potential entrants at t = 0. It is the common prior distribution which is updated in
light of experience.
Production.–Firms are infinitessimal and of indeterminate size. Production cost
is zero, and the salvage value of production capacity is negligible. As long the price
is positive, industry output is the same as the industry’s capacity to produce it.
Let k denote the industry’s capacity and let n denote new capacity, i.e., aggregate
investment. Capacity does not depreciate, and, as long industry price is positive, it
is not scrapped. Therefore, capacity evolves as follows
k0 = k + n. (1)
Initial capacity, k0 ≥ 0 is given.
Investment.–Adjustment costs of investment are rising at the industry level, but
constant at the level of an individual firm. The unit cost, c, of adding capacity rises
with aggregate investment:
c = C (n) ,
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Figure 4: Scrappage at date T
where C 0 (n) ≥ 0. An example is a scarce input into the construction of capacity
the price of which rises with aggregate investment. to reflect a pecuniary or non-
pecuniary congestion effect. Each firm sees C (n) as independent of its of its own
actions. Investment becomes productive capacity in the following period.
Industry viability.–To ensure that the industry can get off the ground in the first
place, we assume that if no one else were to invest, it would be optimal to do so. The
discounted proceeds that a unit of capacity would deliver if the market were never to
crash would be βp/ (1− β). The cost of creating a unit of capacity if no one else is
creating it would be C (0). Hence our viability condition is
C (0) <
βp
1− β . (2)
Learning.–Firms share the common prior over z; the C.D.F. F (z). All firms
know the history of prices and industry outputs. Based on this they revise their
opinion about z. “Overshooting” happens at date T when k exceeds z for the first
time. Before date T , firms know only that z ≥ k. At date T , we assume that firms
learn z exactly.2
To recapitulate, there are three distinct epochs:
1. Before dateT .–Agents know only that k ≤ z.
2This is the simplest way to have a permanent decline in the value of existing capital at T . Other
scenarios entailing more gradual learning about z after date T would also lead to a sharp decline in
value at date T .
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2. At date T .–The first time that k > z, firms learn z, perhaps because spare
capacity kT − z becomes public information. This excess capacity is at once
scrapped for a return of s and equilibrium product price is (1− β) s. This is
illustrated in Figure 4.
3. After date T .–Product price remains for ever at s, and the stock price remains
for ever at s. There is no further dynamics
To simplify the algebra we assume that s = 0.
The unit value of capacity.–Suppose that when information that firms have is only
k and the knowledge of whether k. The value of a unit of capacity in an industry
with the state
V (k, z) =
½
v(k) if k ≤ z
0 if k > z.
We have, in other words, assumed that the value of all firms drops to zero if and when
k exceeds z for the first time. The idea is that the salvage value of the capital is low
and that the capital does not depreciate. Therefore, once industry capacity outstrips
demand, the product price crashes to zero, and with it the market value of the firm.
At that date z becomes publicly known and k − z units are scrapped.
2.1 Equilibrium
All the dynamics in the model stop after date T . The dynamics that we now discuss
is for dates t = 1, 2, ..., T , i.e., for periods during which kt < z.
In this equilibrium strategies depend only on the industry state, k. All firms are
of measure zero, so it does not matter whether new capacity is created by incumbents
or by new entrants. We therefore do not distinguish between the two and, as a result,
we do not have a theory of firm size; all we need is that firms be of measure zero.
Stock prices.–Investors are all rational.3 The Bellman equation in the region
k < z is a function of the investment rule n (k) which leads to next period capacity
k0 = k + n (k), so that
v (k) = p+ βv (k + n [k])
1− F (k + n [k])
1− F (k) (3)
Optimal investment.–We assume that C (0) = 0, and that C (n) is unbounded.
Then the marginal investment condition always holds with equality. In state k, it
reads
C (n [k]) = βv (k + n [k])
1− F (k + n [k])
1− F (k) . (4)
3This distinguishes our model from many in the finance literature, e.g., Abreu and Brunnemeier
(2002)
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Definition 1 Equilibrium is a pair of functions v (k) and n (k) defined for k ∈ [0, z]
that satisfy (3) and (4).
Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.–We do not have a general proof.
Instead, we can show that a unique equilibrium exists only in three special cases,
two of which are not consistent with Figure 1. We now reduce the two equilibrium
conditions (3) and (4) to a single (second-order) difference equation. Then, we shall
prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium by showing that a unique
solution exists to this difference equation.
Substituting from (4) into (3), the relation is
v (k) = p+ C (n [k]) . (5)
From (5) it is clear that if we can get n to rise over time, C will rise and, hence, so
will v. That is, stock prices will rise with t until date T .
With (4) this implies
C(n) = β (p+ C [n0])
1− F (k + n)
1− F (k) . (6)
or, rearranged,
C (n0) = −p+ C (n) 1
β
1− F (k)
1− F (k + n)
= −p+ C (n) 1
β
exp
½Z k+n
k
h (s) ds
¾
(7)
where h (z) = f(z)
1−F (z) . Upon using (1) to eliminate n, we obtain an implicit second-
order difference equation in k:
C (k00 − k0) = −p+ C (k0 − k) 1
β
1− F (k)
1− F (k0)
The initial condition k0 is not sufficient to pin down a unique path.
2.2 Two special cases
We can easily calculate the unique equilibrium for two special cases of the model.
However, both entail stock prices that remain constant until date T .
1. Constant-hazard.–Let F (z) = 1− e−λz. Then h (z) = λ and (7) collapses to
C (n0) = −p+ C (n)β−1eλn
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The only admissible solution is a constant nt, which solves for n the equation
C (n) = βe−λn
p
1− βe−λn all t. (8)
The LHS of (8) is increasing in n while the RHS is decreasing therefore the
solution is unique. (Moreover, any non-stationary solution (nt) would be ex-
plosive because β−1eλn > 1 for all n ≥ 0). Since n is constant, (5) tells us that
stock prices, v (k), will be constant until date T , and iterations of (1) imply
that kt = k0 + nt for t ≤ T .
2. Constant C (n).–Let C (n) = c for all n. This is Rob’s (1991) case. Then (2)
implies that c < βp
1−β , and (4) always holds a positive n. Then (5) implies that
v (k) = p+ c for all k. I.e., stock prices are again constant. Finally, (6) reads
1 +
p
c
=
1
β
1− F (k)
1− F (k + n) ,
which, by c < βp
1−β , implies the existence of a unique investment function n =
ψ (k) > 0. Together with (1), this gives the sequence kt uniquely.
Evidently, we must relax both assumptions if we are to have any chance of rec-
onciling this model with the rising stock prices in Figure 1. We now undertake that
task.
3 The case of a decreasing h.
This section derives properties that an equilibrium must satisfy if h0 < 0 and C 0 > 0.
Then we shall show that a unique equilibrium exists when F is Pareto and when
C (n) = cn. We start with the general case.4
Assumptions on F .–Suppose that the support of F is [zmin,∞). Suppose fur-
thermore that h (z) > 0 for all z > zmin, and that h0 (z) < 0. That is, F has a
strictly decreasing hazard. Assume, moreover, that limz→∞ h (z) = 0.We relax these
assumptions in Section 4.2 where we impose a finite bound on z.
Analysis.–Now define the scalar n∞ implicitly as the solution to the equation
C (n∞) =
βp
1− β . (9)
Lemma 2 If n∞ ≡ limt→∞ nt exists, then it is unique and satisfies (9)
4Prat (2003) provides a survivorship-bias type of rationale for why the hazard rate may be
declining, especially when the uncertainty over market types is large.
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Proof. The RHS of (4) is at most equal to the RHS (9). Therefore
nt < n∞.
Moreover, the conditional probability of the market surviving for another period is
ξ (k, n) ≡ 1− F (k + n)
1− F (k) = exp
½
−
Z k+n
k
h (z) dz
¾
(10)
If h is decreasing, ξ is increasing in k and decreasing in n. Since kt is an increasing
sequence, we then must have
ξ (kt, nt) ≥ ξ (k0, n∞)
Therefore for any t, the return to a unit of incumbent capital is
vt =
∞X
j=t
βj−t
jY
τ=t
ξ (kτ , nτ) p
≥ p
∞X
j=t
[βξ (k0, n∞)]
j−t
≥ p
1− βξ (k0, n∞)
Therefore, for any t
nt ≥ nmin > 0,
where nmin solves
C (nmin) =
βξ (k0, n∞) p
1− βξ (k0, n∞)
But then kt ≥ tnmin, and so limt→∞ kt = ∞. Therefore the RHS of (7) converges to
p+ C (n) /β. Rearranging, we get (9).
The next proposition contains the result we need. The algebra simplifies if we
re-state the difference equation (7) as a difference equation in c = C (n). Assume
that C is a one-to one increasing map from R+ → R+ and that its range is all of R+
so that n (c) ≡ C−1 [c] is uniquely defined for all c ≥ 0. Then write (7) as
c0 = −p+ c
β
exp
(Z k+n(c)
k
h (z) dz
)
(11)
≡ φ (c, k) .
This difference equation is easier to work with
Proposition 3 Before the crash (i.e., for t < T ),
nt+1 > nt.
9
Proof. Since n (c) is strictly increasing, φ (c, k) is strictly increasing in c. Since h (z)
is a decreasing function, φ (c, k) is strictly decreasing in k. Suppose, contrary to the
claim, that nt+1 ≤ nt. Then ct+1 ≤ ct. Since C (0) = 0, we must have nt+1 > 0, or
else (4) would be violated. But then kt+1 > kt, and therefore
ct+2 = φ (ct+1, kt+1) < φ (ct, kt) = ct+1.
Iterating this argument leads to the conclusion that
nt ≥ nt+1 =⇒ nt+1 > nt+2 > .... ≥ nmin
And since the initial value nt < n∞, we conclude that limt nt < n∞. But kt ≥
tnmin and once again limt→∞ kt = ∞, and therefore (9) must hold, and this is a
contradiction.
Since a bounded monotone sequence must have a limit, we conclude that (nt)
indeed does have a limit and that this unique limit solves (9).
Lemma 4 If h is decreasing in z, φ is decreasing in k.
Proof. Differentiating,
∂φ
∂k
=
£
h
¡
k + C−1 [c]
¢
− h (k)
¤ c
β
exp
(Z k+C−1(c)
k
h (z) dz
)
< 0
because h is decreasing, whereas C−1 [c] > 0.
Since φ decreases with k, the mode of convergence will therefore be as shown in
Figure 5.
Older markets are less likely to crash–An equilibrium of this sort will imply a
rising probability of survival for the market along the equilibrium path. From (7)
and (10) the conditional survival probability is
ξ (kt, nt) =
1
β
·
p
C (nt)
+
C (nt+1)
C (nt)
¸−1
By Proposition 3 C is increasing with t and C(nt+1)C(nt) > 1 on the transition path. The
survival probability therefore rises overall from 1β
h
p
C(n0) +
C(n1)
C(n0)
i−1
to 1β
h
p
C(n∞) + 1
i−1
,
but we cannot show that the increase is monotonic.
3.1 Simulated example: Pareto F
We simulate the equilibrium of a special case of a decreasing hazard distribution, the
Pareto distribution:
F (z) = 1−
µ
z
zmin
¶−ρ
.
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Figure 5: Behavior of the solution, ct, to the difference equation (11).
We shall show that a unique equilibrium exists in this case. Its hazard rate is ρz . Now
(6) reads
C (n) = β (p+ C [n0])
µ
k
k0
¶ρ
Then, since k0 = k + n, this equation reads
C (n) = β (p+ C [n0])
µ
1
1 + nk
¶ρ
which we can rearrange this into the difference equation
C (n0) = −p+ C (n) 1
β
³
1 +
n
k
´ρ
(12)
This is the specific form depicted in Figure (5).
Assume that
C (n) = cn
Then (12) reads
n0 = −p
c
+
1
β
n
³
1 +
n
k
´ρ
(13)
The second difference equation is
k0 = k + n (14)
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The Appendix proves the existence and uniqueness of the solution to (13), (14) for
the sequence (kt) . It also describes in detail the algorithm used to find the simulated
solution to the second-order difference equation implied by (13) and (14):
kt+2 = kt+1 +
1
β
(kt+1 − kt)
µ
kt+1
kt
¶ρ
− p
c
.
The simulation in the next figure is based on the following parameter values:
parameter p c ρ β
calibrated value 7.83 0.033 1 1.1
The Figure portrays the simulated time paths of nt and kt against their observed
proxies: the actual Telecom sales series used as the proxy for k and the fist difference
of sales as the proxy for nt.
4 Fundamentals and the crash
Before estimating the model formally, we argue that its basic assumptions and im-
plications are plausible. We focus on four components of the model: (i) The role of
Telecom-product prices, (ii) The behavior of price-earnings ratios, (iii) time to build,
and (iv) the assumption of perfect competition.
4.1 Telecom-product prices
Let pt denote the telecom index. The model predicts that pt = p¯ until date T (i.e.,
March 2000), and that at T , pt should fall to (1− β) s and that it should stay there.
Figure 6 shows the product-price index. Clearly the decline is much more gradual
but it is nevertheless substantial and happens at about the right time.
4.2 Price-earnings ratios of telecom firms
The model implies not only a rise in stock prices, but also a rise in a monotonic rise
in the Price-earnings ratio.5 This is driven by the monotonic rise in the market’s
survival probability (the mirror image of the declining hazard and the rising market-
survival probability). Figure 7 plots the evolution of the average P-E ratio, and that
of the various percentiles of the P-E distribution. The Figure shows that P-E indeed
does rise slightly over the sample period. Its dispersion also rises, (which the model
does not explain)
5We thank Raj Mehra for urging us to report this ratio.
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Figure 6: Price index for Telecom output
Figure 7: Evolution of the P/E ratio
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 Figure 8: Value share by value rank
4.3 Time to build delays
The spirit of the model is that the crash happens when capacity overshoots demand.
This could not happen to any great extent (i.e., kT could not exceed z by much) if
capacity creation was instantaneous. In that event prices would at once signal that
further creation was unwarranted and serious spare capacity could not develop. For
the mechanism to be credible, there must be significant time to build delays. Koeva
(2000, Table 1) reports a 24-month time-to-build estimate for Telecom — roughly the
economy-wide average.
A vivid historical example where time to build probably helped magnify a price
collapse is the market for office space in New York City around the 1929 crash. Many
office buildings were commissioned weeks or months before the crash of 1929, but
were completed afterwards. The best known among these are the Chrysler Building,
completed in the spring of 1930, and the Empire State building some months later.
Both remained largely vacant until WW2, contributing to the collapse of office-space
rents in the area.
4.4 Market shares of telecom firms
Firms are competitive in the model. Figure 8 plots the capitalizations of the leading
Telecom companies on the Nasdaq, as a fraction of the total Telecom capitalization
on the Nasdaq. Because some major players like Motorola do not list on the Nasdaq,
these numbers overestimate the shares of these firms. The leading five Nasdaq firms
accounted for just under 50% of Nasdaq Telecom’s capitalization, but a sizably smaller
share of NYSE + Nasdaq together.
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5 Estimating h with panel data
To estimate h we need data on a set of markets. In our model a market crash happens
only once in any market. Figure 2 confirms the model’s prediction that market crashes
are accompanied by reductions in sales. Thus when we move to larger data sets on
which we have no stock-price information, we shall infer a crash where we see a large
sales reduction. Where we find no such reductions, we shall assume no crash has
taken place. We shall use the following two data sets:
1. Jorgenson’s data from BLS and BEA for 35 industries defined at the 2-digit
SIC level — a fairly aggregate level.6.
2. Gort and Klepper (1982) (“GK”) collected data on 46 fairly narrow products.
For 16 of those industries, data on sales and prices time series are available
continuously. See Appendix C for details.
5.1 Construction of the Measure of Demand Hazard
For both GK’s and Jorgenson’s data-sets we proceeded as follows (Appendix C also
describes in detail the data that the names used below correspond to).
1. In our model, k is proportional to sales. As a proxy for k we shall therefore use
real_salesi ≡
salesi
CPI
to be the real sales of industry i.
2. We interpret a “consistent” decline in the real_sales time series (or its flat-
tening out) after a continuous consecutive rise as a “failure” that is a realization
of z.7 We follow Stock’s (2001) suggestion and model structurally our break
in trend. Consequently we search for such a point in the real_sales series.
We Re-phrase this search problem as a search of a structural break or a broken
trend or change in regime in a time series. We need the unknown date of the
break. When that date is unknown, usual Chow tests are problematic8, and
there is more than one way to proceed.— Stock (2001) has a survey. We chose
a procedure to find the break in trend which exploits the SupWald statistic
6Dataset collection and decomposition methodology are described at
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jorgenson/data/35klem.html.
7Units sold increase until z for that particular industry is reached: after that units sold should
be constant or decreasing (for one period) according to our model.
8They work fine when we know a priori that two samples come from different populations. If first
we have to choose the break point and then run a Chow test, we have to change the test distributions
to avoid pre-testing bias.
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as introduced in [3]. Industries for which such a point exist record a value of
z = 1 at such level of real_sales. Pictures in the appendix report the level
in ureal_sales time series that discriminant analysis suggest being z for each
industry. Of course it might be the case that such point does not exist for some
industries: in this case our z-dummy for such industries will assume the value
0 everywhere (meaning industry is a censored observation).
3. At this point we use survival analysis tools to estimate the empirical hazard
implied by the {z,real_sales} series where real_sales replaces time in or-
dinary survival analysis while z is the ordinary failure dummy.
4. A third issue is left censoring. In the GK data, it is claimed that the number
of firms in the industry is recorded since the very first introduction of the
product. Still time series for units_sold and prices are only collected starting
1943. In Jorgenson’s data-set time series are all collected starting 1957, clearly
not the first date of introduction of many of the goods represented, so that left
censoring is a serious problem. We simply assume that these industries started
their life in 1957. We think that the data, used under this assumption, are still
a useful way to test our hypothesis that the hazard rate decreases — it should
decrease regardless of when (i.e., at what true age) we start estimating it.
5.2 Non-parametric estimates of the hazard
Demand Hazard is non-parametrically estimated using Kaplan-Meyer estimator. The
following picture summarizes our main findings:
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The picture reports Kaplan-Meyer empirical hazard estimate9 on the entire sample
of 16 industries for GK’s data and on the entire sample of 35 industries for Jorgenson’s
9The Nelson-Aalen estimator of the cumulative hazard is defined up to the largest observed time
as: bH (t) = X
j|tj≤t
dj
nj
where nt is population alive at t and dt is number of failures up to time t.
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data (note that “analysis time” in duration analysis is real_sales according to
our procedure). As it is clear from the picture we cannot accept the assumption
of a decreasing hazard across the board. A strong non-monotonicity is apparent.
The good news is that a consistent part of the hazard is initially decreasing: if the
crash happens in this portion of the demand, the predictions of the model could be
supported. It is sometimes hard to interpret variation in the hazard: the cumulated
hazard is an alternative smoothed version of it. Its being concave suggest the hazard
being decreasing. We report below Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard estimate:
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Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard estimate
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Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard estimate
It displays a very “rough concavity”, overall. The Jorgenson data reveal a similar
hazard and smoothed hazard estimate. The pattern in these data is similar, but
the hazard estimate decreases for a longer span and the cumulative hazard is more
concave. This is more in line with our model.
6 Robustness and extensions
This section gathers some extensions and robustness checks
6.1 Non-monotone hazard
This subsection shows that if we start with the Pareto-distributed z of Section 3.1,
and impose a finite limit, Z, on market size z, (thereby making the hazard rate non-
monotonic, rising sharply at z = Z) the equilibrium does not change much as long as
Z is large. Let
θ ≡ F (Z) ,
The empirical hazard is:
h (tj) ≡ H (tj)−H (tj−1) =
dtj
ntj
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Figure 9: Finite (dashed) vs. infinite (solid) equilibrium
and define the CDF of the new truncated distribution of z as
G (z, θ) =
½
1
θF (z) for z ≤ F−1 (θ)
1 for z > F−1 (θ)
Let
¡
kθt
¢∞
t=0 be an equilibrium sequence for the distribution G (z, θ), so that (k
1
t )
∞
0 is
the equilibrium sequence of Section 2. In this subsection we shall show that for each
t,
lim
θ→1
kθt = k
1
t .
In this sense, a large finite world in which z ≤ Z approximates the infinite world of
the Pareto prior over z. The general idea is portrayed in Figure 9.
Substituting G for F in (7), it reads
C (n0) = −p+ C (n) 1
β
1−G (k, θ)
1−G (k + n, θ)
When F is Pareto with ρ = 1,
G (z, θ) =
1
θ
"
1−
µ
z
zmin
¶−1#
for z < Z, where
Z =
zmin
1− θ .
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Then (7) reads
k00 = k0 +
(k0 − k)
β


θ − 1 +
³
k
zmin
´−ρ
θ − 1 +
³
k0
zmin
´−ρ

− p
c
≡ ψ (k0, k, θ) (15)
Then if
¡
kθt
¢∞
t=0 is an equilibrium sequence, it must be obtainable by iterating ψ from
the pair
¡
k0, kθ1
¢
. Note that
lim
θ→1
ψ (k0, k, θ) = k0 +
(k0 − k)
β
µ
k0
k
¶ρ
− p
c
(16)
Lemma 5 For θ sufficiently close to unity,
∂
∂k0
µ
k00
k0
¶
> 0.
Proof. At θ = 1,
k00
k0
= 1 +
¡
1− kk0
¢
β
µ
k0
k
¶ρ
− p
k0c
so that ∂∂k0
¡k00
k0
¢
> 0 at θ = 1. But ∂2ψ/∂k0∂θ exists in the neighborhood of θ = 1
and the claim follows.
Then if k0 rises (thereby raising k00/k0 as well), it turns out that k000/k00 will rise
too:
Lemma 6 For θ sufficiently close to unity, ∂∂k0
¡k00
k0
¢
> 0 implies that
∂
∂k0
µ
k000
k00
¶
> 0.
Proof. At θ = 1,
k000
k00
= 1 +
¡
1− k0k00
¢
β
µ
k00
k0
¶ρ
− p
k00c
so that ∂∂k0
¡k000
k00
¢
> 0 at θ = 1. Since the cross-partial derivatives exist in the neigh-
borhood of θ = 1, the claim follows.
Corollary 7 For θ sufficiently close to unity,
∂kθt
∂k1
> 0
Proof. For any t, Lemmas 5 and 6 imply that a simultaneous rise in k1 will raise
k2/k1 which, in turn, implies a rise in k3/k2 and so on. This proves the claim.
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Proposition 8 For each t,
lim
θ→∞
kθt = k
1
t .
Proof. The proof is in four steps.
(i) ψ is continuous on the set Aθ = {(k, k0) | k ≤ k0 and F (k0) < θ.}.
(ii) If (k, k0) are continuous in θ, so is k00. This follows from (i)
(iii) If n0 is continuous in θ, so is kt for any t, as long (kt−1, kt) ∈ Aθ. This is
because k0 is fixed and in because we can iterate the result in (ii) using ψ.
(iv) nθ0 is continuous in θ at θ = 1. Suppose not. Then n
θ
0 would jump at θ = 1.
Suppose the jump was positive. Then k1/k0 would jump up. Then by Lemmas 5 and
6 and Corollary 7, kt would jump up for each t. But then (4) (which must hold at
θ = 1) would fail to hold at some θ < 1. To see why re-write it as
cnθ0 = p
∞X
t=0
βt
Ã
1−G
¡
kθt , θ
¢
1−G
¡
kθ0, θ
¢! (17)
The LHS of (17) would jump up. But the RHS is continuous in θ and, as the entire
(kt) sequence jumps up, the RHS would exhibit a downward jump, a contradiction.
Similar logic works if nθ0 has a negative jump.
Putting (i)− (iv) together proves the claim.
Via (5), this result implies that stock prices, vt, and industry output, kt, also
converge to the equilibrium we described in Section 3.1. Thus the main thrust of the
results of Section 3 holds up in finite worlds in which the demand hazard eventually
starts to rise.
6.2 Contagion upstream
We have so far modelled a single industry and applied it to the Telecom sector. The
Telecom sector is a part of the Nasdaq, yet the entire Nasdaq crashed. This section
shows how the crash in one sector can spread to an upstream sector. Assume that
k is produced competitively by a fixed number µ of firms in the upstream industry.
For a give capital-goods firm the cost of producing x units of capital is g (x) , where
g0 > 0 and g00 > 0. Consider the symmetric situation in which every capital-goods
firm produces the same amount, x. Suppose that k is purchased only by one industry.
That is, the only downstream buyers of k are in the industry we have modelled in
the previous sections. Equilibrium then requires that
n = µx.
The price per unit of capital is C (n), where n is investment in the downstream
industry. The first-order condition for optimal production of k is
C (n) = g0
µ
n
µ
¶
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Therefore the market value of each capital-good producer is
Vk,t =
∞X
τ=t
βτ−t
·
C (nτ)− g
µ
nτ
µ
¶¸
.
and the value of the industry is µVk,t. Now C (n) − g
³
n
µ
´
= g0
³
n
µ
´
− g
³
n
µ
´
is
increasing in n.
Simultaneous crashes upstream and downstream.–As n rises, so does the value
of the upstream producers. When the downstream industry crashes, so does the
upstream industry. When nt permanently falls to zero, Vk,t does too. If the indus-
try supplies capital to more than one final-good industry, then the the equilibrium
condition changes; Vk,t would still fall, but not to zero.
7 Conclusion
This paper has linked the phenomenon of market crashes and excess capacity. As
Figure 2 shows, Telecom is not the only industry where stock prices and output both
fell suddenly. Other markets, including the market for PC, unexpectedly became
“saturated” making further investment unprofitable (Wall Street Journal 2000). Yet
these were the very markets where, prior to the crash, there was a stock-price run-up.
The driving force behind the price run-up was, we argue, a rise in optimism. In
our model, this rising optimism in the model is fully rational, provided that prior
beliefs over market size have a decreasing hazard. Cross-industry evidence favoring
such hazards, however, is not conclusive. For now, all we can claim is that we have
explained how “saturation” can develop and cause a market to crash, and explored
how to go about judging whether this mechanism is important.
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8 Appendix A: NASDAQ index formulas
The section explains how we arrived at Figures 1, 2, and so on. Some definitions first:
• The market capitalization is obtained by multiplying the number of shares
in issue by the mid price.
• The mid price of a security is obtained by taking the average between the
best bid price and the best offer price available on the market during normal
business hours.
• The number of shares outstanding are used to calculate the market capital-
ization for each component of the index. These shares represent capital invested
by the firm’s shareholders and owners, and may be all or only a portion of the
number of shares authorized10.
• Constituent is any firm listed on NASDAQ
The Nasdaq Composite Index is weighted arithmetically where the weights are
the market capitalizations of its constituents. The index is the summation of the
market values (or capitalizations) of all companies within the index and each con-
stituent company is weighted by its market value (shares in issue multiplied by the
mid price). The formula used for calculating the index is straightforward. However,
determining the capitalization of each constituent company and calculating the capi-
talization adjustments to the index are more complex. The index value itself is simply
a number which represents the total market value of all companies within the index
at a particular point in time compared to a comparable calculation at the starting
point. The daily index value is calculated by dividing the total market value of all
constituent companies by a number called the divisor. The divisor is then adjusted
when changes in capitalization occur to the constituents of the index (see Revision
of the Divisor) allowing the index value to remain comparable over time.
It = I0
total market valuet
divisort
= I0
PNt
i=1 PitSit
Dt
where t is the date at which we want to calculate the index I, t = 0 is a reference
date or base date we start with (like February 1971 for the composite index which is
10Shares that have been issued and subsequently repurchased by the company for cancellation are
called treasury shares, because they are held in the corporate treasury pending reissue or retirement.
Treasury shares are legally issued but are not considered outstanding for purposes of voting, divi-
dends, or earnings per share calculation. Shares authorised but not yet issued are called un-issued
shares. Most companies show the amount of authorised, issued and outstanding, and treasury shares
in the capital section of their annual reports. It is possible to back out the total number of out-
standing shares of each company from the balance sheet. In COMPUSTAT it is possible to obtain
market capitalization by using the following DATA items: (DATA6+DATA199*DATA25-DATA60)
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set to 100) Pit is the price of a share of company i at date t, Sit is the total number
of shares outstanding for company i at date t and Dt is a divisor, introduced to make
the index comparable over time (basically keeps track of changing in the pool of firms
or their share policies and allows the composite index only to track growth rates over
periods) and defined below:
Dt =
N0X
i=1
Pi0Si0 +
tX
j=1
Gj−1
I0
Ij−1
where Gj−1 is net new money raised at time j−1 through the issue of new companies,
new shares, rights issues, capital reorganizations or even capital repayments. This
figure may be negative. If G is zero between periods the index boils down to:
It =
total market valuet
totalmarket value0
I0 = I0
NtX
i=1
PitSitPN0
i=1 Pi0Si0
9 Appendix B: Existence, uniqueness and simula-
tion of solutions to (13), (14)
The pair of difference equations [(13), (1)] in (n, k) has no finite steady state for k.
In order to be able to linearize around a steady state, we change variables from k,
the level of capacity, to its rate of growth
x =
n
k
.
We shall now analyze the evolution of the pair (n, x). The change of variables trans-
forms the pair (13) and (1) into the following pair of difference equations
n0 = −p
c
+ n
1
β
(1 + x)ρ , (18)
x0 =
x
(1 + x)
·
− p
cn
+
1
β
(1 + x)ρ
¸
. (19)
Lemma 9 (13) and (1) are equivalent to (18) and (19).
Proof. In the law of motion for k,
k0 = k + n,
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divide by n0 to obtain
k0
n0
=
k
n0
+
n
n0
=
k
n
n
n0
+
n
n0
=
µ
1 +
k
n
¶
n
n0
.
Inverting both sides,
n0
k0
=
n0
n
1¡
1 + kn
¢
=
1¡
1 + kn
¢
n
·
−p
c
+ n
1
β
³
1 +
n
k
´ρ¸
=
1¡
1 + kn
¢ ·− p
cn
+
1
β
³
1 +
n
k
´ρ¸
=
x
(1 + x)
·
− p
cn
+
1
β
(1 + x)ρ
¸
Therefore (13) and (1) are equivalent to (18) and (19).
These equations have the unique steady state. Now the steady state of the system
is µ
n
x
¶
=
µ βp
(1−β)c
0
¶
So let us linearize around it. The Jacobian evaluated at the steady state is· 1
β
pρ
(1−β)c
0 1
¸
The characteristic roots are
³
1
β , 1
´
. As is standard we set n0 = n and x0 = x to find
two curves crossing in the steady state
n0 = n =⇒ n = p
c
µ
β
[1 + x]ρ − β
¶
≡ Φ (x)
x0 = x =⇒ n = pβ
c
µ
1
[1 + x]ρ − β (1 + x)
¶
≡ Ψ (x)
These are the two demarcation curves in the phase diagram, and they cross at the
steady state. Both are downward sloping (at least if ρ = 1) the ratio
Ψ (x)
Φ (x)
=
[1 + x]ρ − β
[1 + x]ρ − β − βx =



> 1 if x > 0
= 1 if x = 0
< 1 if x < 0
.
26
0 x
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stable manifold
Φ(x)
Ψ(x)
Figure 10: Phase diagram for n and x = nk .
So, Ψ (x) is steeper than Φ (x), and the two curves cross at the steady state, as
shown in Figure11 10. The area where either n < 0 or x < 0 is not relevant for the
pre-overshooting stage of the game, hence it is shaded.
To be able to draw the typical arrows on the phase diagram rewrite the system as
n0 = −p
c
+ n
1
β
(1 + x)ρ ≡ A (x, n) ,
x0 =
x
(1 + x)
·
− p
cn
+
1
β
(1 + x)ρ
¸
≡ B (x, n) .
Then,
A (x,Φ [x]) = n (20)
and
B (x,Ψ [x]) = x (21)
The vertical arrows.–First we show that if n > Φ (x), we move even higher. And
the opposite if n < Φ (x). That is,
Claim 10
n ≷ Φ (x) =⇒ A (x, n) ≷ n.
Proof. The relevant portion of the phase diagram is that for x ≥ 0. For all such x,
∂A (x, n)
∂n
≥ 1
β
> 1
11Mathematica was used to draw the stable manifold.
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Together with (20) the claim follows.
The horizontal arrows.–Next we show that if n > Ψ (x), we move to the right.
And if n < Ψ (x), we move to the left. That is,
Claim 11
n ≷ Ψ (x) =⇒ B (x, n) ≷ x.
Proof. We have
∂B (x, n)
∂n
=
x
(1 + x)
p
cn2
> 0
if x > 0. Together with (21) the claim follows.
These two claims pin down the arrows that are displayed in Figure 10 along with
the saddle path. The evolution of n and x is valid only before the overshooting date.
The shaded area is not admissible because x cannot be negative.
9.0.1 Simulating the Model
In the figure below we plot the time path for n. This figure shows in greater detail
what would happen to the trajectory if it did not start on the saddle path.
Equilibrium time path for nt as it approaches n∞
We now describe the algorithm we used to simulate the model:
1. Choose an initial condition for k0
2. Posit a rather coarse initial grid for initial values n0
3. For each n0 from the grid simulate the system equations to generate values for
the sequences {n, k}t for many periods
28
4. Discard any n0 for which the nt sequence either explodes, or is not not monotone
increasing
5. Once all the n0 in the initial grid are tried we choose the n0 with the longest
number of observations (before explosion or violation of monotonicity cut off
the simulation) and make up a finer grid around it
6. The process starts over at point 3 up to the point we can find an initial condition
that can generate a monotone sequence for “enough” periods.
The simulations portrayed in Section 3.1 plot the time-paths simulated nt and kt
against their observed proxies: the actual Telecom sales series used as a proxy for
capital (sales_total) and the fist difference of sales_total (a proxy for nt).
10 Appendix C: The Gort-Klepper data
Appendix C reports the names of the products whose time series were used in our
estimations as well as their SIC codes. A “?” or xxxx next to a SIC code means that
the SIC code for the corresponding industry is not sure or unknown. Unfortunately in
GK’s and Jorgenson’s data set the SIC codes are not reported. The tables report what
we could retrieve with confidence. “sub” followed by a 4-digit number, means that
the product is below the finest 4-digit industry SIC classification, hence not available
in Census data: data are from one or more products making up the corresponding
4-digit level of aggregation data (but not all of them). More than one ”sub” implies
that data for that product correspond to products making up more than one SIC
4-digit industry.
product_index product name SIC
6 computers sub3571
7 crystal piezo sub3679
8 ddt sub2879
9 electrocardiographs sub3845
10 electric blankets sub3634
15 freezers home and farm sub3632
18 lasers sub3674?
21 missiles guided sub3761
24 nylon sub2821/sub2284/sub2824/sub2281/sub2282
26 penicillin sub2834/sub2833
27 pens ball point sub3951
40 styrene sub2821/sub2911 /sub2869
43 tape recording sub3651
45 television receivers monochrome sub3651
48 transistors sub3674
50 tubes cathode ray sub3671
GK dataset products, codes (used in STATA analysis), and SIC category
In Section 4.1 the time series of the GK data-set are named as follows:
product abbreviation code: product_index;
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units sold: units_sold;
sales: total_sales;
price series: price;
period of the real business cycle in which the observation is measured: nber_rbc_code;
dummy for war periods: war.
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